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Abstract	  
Since	  educators	  are	  always	  looking	  for	  ways	  to	  improve	  their	  practice,	  and	  since	  empirical	  
science	  is	  now	  accepted	  in	  our	  worldview	  as	  the	  final	  arbiter	  of	  truth,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  they	  
have	  been	  lured	  toward	  cognitive	  neuroscience	  
in	  hopes	  that	  discovering	  how	  the	  brain	  learns	  
will	  provide	  a	  nutshell	  explanation	  for	  student	  
learning	  in	  general.	  I	  argue	  that	  identifying	  the	  
person	  with	  the	  brain	  is	  scientism	  (not	  science),	  
that	  the	  brain	  is	  not	  the	  person,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
person	  who	  learns.	  In	  fact,	  the	  brain	  only	  
responds	  to	  the	  learning	  of	  embodied	  experience	  
within	  the	  extra-­‐neural	  network	  of	  
intersubjective	  communications.	  Learning	  is	  a	  
dynamic,	  cultural	  activity,	  not	  a	  neural	  program.	  
Brain-­‐based	  learning	  is	  unnecessary	  for	  
educators	  and	  may	  be	  dangerous	  in	  that	  a	  culturally	  narrow	  ontology	  is	  taken	  for	  granted,	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Introduction	  
Human experience is a dance that unfolds in the world and with others. You are 
not your brain. We are not locked up in a prison of our own ideas and sensations. 
The phenomenon of consciousness, like that of life itself, is a world-involving 
dynamic process. We are already at home in the environment. We are out of our 
heads. (Alva Noë, 2009, p. xiii) 
	  
Science	  has	  become	  much	  more	  than	  an	  experimental	  procedure	  for	  creating	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  objective	  world.	  We	  are	  living	  in	  an	  era	  when	  the	  objective	  reduction	  to	  
material	  facts	  and	  processes	  that	  can	  be	  measured	  defines	  what	  is	  real	  and	  true	  while	  
subjective	  experience	  is	  considered	  unreliable	  (and	  likely	  a	  mere	  product	  of	  processes	  such	  
as	  biological	  evolution,	  genetic	  codes,	  and,	  of	  course,	  neural	  functioning).	  Historically,	  
schools	  readily	  lent	  themselves	  to	  scientific	  measurement	  and	  management	  practices,	  but	  
only	  more	  recently	  have	  we	  turned	  to	  neuroscience	  and	  cognitive	  science	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
directly	  manage	  the	  learning	  process	  itself	  by	  studying	  the	  human	  brain.	  	  
	  
All	  knowing	  is	  done	  within	  a	  context	  and	  that	  context	  will	  have	  layers	  from	  the	  
many	  perspectives	  within	  the	  individual	  to	  his	  or	  her	  social	  circles	  to	  the	  various	  
overlapping	  cultures	  to	  an	  emerging	  global	  zeitgeist	  and	  back	  again;	  such	  is	  the	  layered	  
nature	  of	  personhood.	  Much	  in	  the	  way	  we	  presume	  a	  fish	  is	  unaware	  of	  the	  water	  it	  is	  in	  
because	  its	  milieu	  is	  so	  pervasive	  it	  cannot	  be	  observed,	  so	  we	  are	  often	  unaware	  of	  our	  
cultural	  contexts	  and	  even	  more	  unaware	  of	  the	  predominant	  worldview	  that	  is	  
experienced	  as	  though	  it	  is	  self-­‐evident.	  In	  technologically	  advanced	  nations	  with	  a	  strong	  
industrial	  base	  and	  a	  unified	  system	  of	  higher	  education,	  the	  scientific	  worldview	  of	  
objective,	  mechanistic	  materialism	  has	  clearly	  become	  predominant.	  Our	  overwhelming	  
success	  in	  technology,	  especially	  computer	  technology	  and	  the	  internet,	  has	  so	  changed	  our	  
2
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communication	  practices	  that	  we	  have	  begun	  to	  experience	  each	  other	  as	  disembodied	  
minds	  (minds	  that	  function	  on	  computational	  processes	  at	  that).	  This	  situation	  has	  helped	  
neuroscience	  and	  cognitive	  science	  become	  arbiters	  of	  truth	  with	  the	  final	  say	  about	  how	  
knowing	  becomes	  knowledge.	  However,	  reducing	  the	  person	  to	  the	  computational	  brain	  is	  
not	  science,	  but	  is	  instead	  scientism.	  	  
	  
Scientism	  takes	  the	  foundational	  principles	  of	  empirical	  or	  mathematical	  
investigation	  and	  assumes	  them	  to	  constitute	  reality.	  Scientism	  functions	  as	  an	  overall	  
worldview	  in	  the	  way	  belief	  systems	  like	  religion	  or	  ideology	  do.	  It	  is	  not	  scientific	  
exploration	  so	  much	  as	  the	  presumption	  that	  such	  exploration	  is	  already	  or	  will	  soon	  be	  
complete.	  All	  will	  be	  answered	  by	  science	  via	  experiment	  and	  reductionism	  –	  quantitative	  
measurement	  –	  within	  materialism.	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  even	  the	  human	  mind	  (private	  
sensations,	  thoughts,	  emotions),	  which	  each	  of	  us	  experiences	  so	  directly,	  can	  be	  now	  be	  
explained	  away	  by	  studying	  the	  brain.	  However,	  such	  scientism	  does	  knowledge	  an	  
injustice	  by	  ignoring	  ways	  of	  knowing	  that	  will	  not	  be	  contained	  within	  the	  scientistic	  
worldview	  including	  the	  reduction	  of	  consciousness	  itself	  to	  pre-­‐determined	  effects	  of	  
brain	  activity.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  experimental	  and	  theoretic	  sciences	  have	  sometimes	  become	  
so	  authoritative	  (if	  not	  downright	  authoritarian)	  that	  they	  can	  declare	  ultimate	  truth,	  not	  
just	  explore	  or	  explain	  its	  mechanisms,	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  leave	  their	  underlying	  ontology	  –	  
mechanistic	  materialism	  –	  unquestioned.	  To	  avoid	  disturbances	  from	  other	  quarters	  that	  
might	  provide	  ontological	  alternatives,	  scientism	  has	  not	  only	  overruled	  the	  insights	  
provided	  by	  religious	  symbols	  and	  the	  arts,	  but	  has	  also	  taken	  the	  position	  that	  philosophy	  
itself	  has	  come	  to	  an	  end	  in	  the	  face	  of	  scientific	  revelation	  (e.g.,	  Hawking	  &	  Mlodinow,	  
2010).	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This	  worldview	  of	  scientism	  has	  become	  so	  well	  established	  in	  our	  time	  that	  it	  is	  
considered	  time-­‐wasting	  philosophy	  –	  the	  utmost	  in	  bad	  taste	  –	  to	  even	  question	  it.	  Stephen	  
Hawking,	  one	  of	  our	  premier	  scientists,	  has	  declared	  that	  “philosophy	  is	  dead.	  Philosophy	  
has	  not	  kept	  up	  with	  modern	  developments	  in	  science,	  particularly	  physics.	  Scientists	  have	  
become	  the	  bearers	  of	  the	  torch	  of	  discovery	  in	  our	  quest	  for	  knowledge”	  (Hawking	  &	  
Mlodinow,	  2010,	  p.	  5).	  Philosophers	  have,	  of	  course,	  protested,	  “To	  the	  contrary,	  when	  
philosophy	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  discussion,	  then	  tacit	  philosophical	  assumptions	  –	  in	  all	  
likelihood	  metaphysical	  assumptions!	  –	  go	  unquestioned”	  (Globus,	  2009,	  p.	  110).	  Exactly.	  
Scientism	  (and	  much	  of	  real	  science)	  has	  precisely	  the	  ontological	  assumptions	  I	  have	  
indicated.	  Philosopher	  and	  scientist,	  Alva	  Noë	  (2009),	  states	  that	  “neuroscience	  today	  
depends	  on	  a	  somewhat	  stagnant	  set	  of	  philosophical	  presumptions”	  (p.	  189),	  one	  of	  which	  
is	  that	  the	  brain	  is	  the	  mind.	  It	  is	  not	  wild-­‐eyed	  spirituality	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  person	  is	  more	  
than	  a	  brain,	  or	  that	  reality	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  at	  least	  as	  large	  a	  subjective	  (experiential)	  
as	  objective	  (material)	  component.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  question	  some	  of	  the	  unspoken	  
philosophical	  (ontological)	  assumptions	  of	  scientism	  that	  have	  led	  to	  faith	  in	  brain-­‐based	  
learning	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  biological	  reductionism	  in	  education	  –	  especially	  those	  to	  do	  
with	  consciousness	  and	  personhood.	  
	  
The	  Neuroscience	  of	  Brain-­Based	  Learning	  
I	  make	  specific	  reference	  here	  to	  brain-­based	  learning,	  though	  I	  recognize	  that	  this	  is	  
an	  umbrella	  term	  for	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  theories,	  methods,	  and	  proposals,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
various	  competing	  marketing	  strategies.	  (The	  brain	  as	  computer	  approach	  bears	  striking	  
similarities.)	  I	  will	  attempt	  no	  comprehensive	  survey	  here	  –	  historical,	  comparative,	  or	  
otherwise	  –	  but	  will	  assume	  a	  generic	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept.i	  It	  is	  claimed	  that	  
4
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everything	  from	  instructional	  practice	  (Laster,	  2007)	  adult	  education	  motivation	  (Materna,	  
2007),	  special	  needs	  learning	  (Sousa,	  2006),	  gifted	  learning	  (Sousa,	  2009),	  behaviour	  
management	  (Tate,	  2006),	  social	  adjustment	  (Sylwester,	  2003),	  to	  students	  brought	  up	  in	  
poverty	  (Jensen,	  2009)	  can	  be	  solved	  or	  at	  least	  ameliorated	  by	  brain	  science.	  But	  I	  will	  not	  
pause	  to	  dissect	  these	  texts.	  My	  goal	  is	  to	  question	  the	  philosophical	  assumptions	  behind	  
brain-­‐based	  learning	  (brain-­‐based	  instruction,	  educational	  neuroscience,	  teaching	  to	  the	  
brain,	  call	  it	  what	  you	  will).	  The	  increasing	  number	  of	  pamphlets,	  expensive	  training	  
workshops,	  books,	  and	  online	  ads	  (often	  aimed	  at	  educators)	  devoted	  to	  brain-­‐based	  
learning	  bears	  witness	  to	  the	  rising	  popularity	  of	  these	  biological	  approaches	  to	  learning.	  I	  
wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  is	  probably	  unnecessary	  for	  educators	  and	  may	  
even	  be	  dangerous	  in	  that	  a	  culturally	  narrow	  ontology	  is	  taken	  for	  granted,	  thus	  restricting	  
our	  creativity	  and	  imagination,	  and	  shrinking	  the	  human	  community.	  
	  
I	  am	  not	  about	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  belaboured	  postmodernesque	  philosophical	  exegesis	  
of	  minds,	  brains,	  and	  words,	  but	  I	  do	  want	  to	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  exactly	  how	  brain-­‐based	  
learning	  is	  to	  be	  understood.	  Clearly,	  if	  learning	  is	  taking	  place,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  learner.	  If	  
learning	  is	  something	  the	  brain	  does	  (as	  brain-­based	  implies),	  can	  the	  learner	  himself	  or	  
herself	  be	  anything	  (or	  anyone)	  other	  than	  the	  brain?	  (Check	  out	  the	  brain-­‐based	  literature	  
and	  you	  will	  lose	  count	  of	  the	  number	  of	  times	  El	  Cerebro	  is	  personified.)	  To	  put	  it	  another	  
way,	  are	  you	  your	  brain?	  This	  may	  seem	  an	  absurd	  question	  to	  many,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  
shortage	  of	  scientific	  and	  philosophic	  research	  that	  insists	  precisely	  on	  this.	  Brain-­‐based	  
learning	  avoids	  this	  question	  by	  depending	  on	  rarer	  currents	  of	  neuro-­‐	  and	  cognitive	  
science	  that	  emphasize	  degrees	  of	  neural	  plasticity	  (from	  epigenetics	  to	  radically	  
responsive	  neural	  mapping)	  that	  indicate	  the	  brain	  responds	  to	  environmental	  stimuli,	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perhaps	  leaving	  room	  for	  conscious	  self-­‐agency	  in	  that	  interaction.	  For	  mainstream	  
cognitive	  science,	  however,	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  brain	  represents	  the	  world	  and	  
directs	  the	  body	  to	  meet	  its	  needs	  in	  that	  world,	  so	  such	  self-­‐agency	  is	  an	  illusion.	  In	  this	  
case,	  the	  material	  brain	  has	  absorbed	  or	  simply	  done	  away	  with	  the	  immaterial	  mind	  (i.e.,	  
conscious	  selfhood).	  How	  have	  we	  managed	  to	  install	  or	  dissolve	  our	  identities	  into	  a	  
jellylike	  1400	  gm	  lump	  of	  pink-­‐grey	  matter?	  When	  and	  how	  did	  we	  become	  our	  brains?	  
	  
Mainstream	  Neuroscience.	  The	  metaphor	  for	  the	  brain	  as	  learner	  
and	  director	  of	  bodily	  behaviour	  is	  the	  machine	  –	  either	  a	  meat	  
machine	  that,	  like	  the	  proverbial	  brain	  in	  a	  vat,	  controls	  our	  
experiences	  by	  controlling	  our	  illusions;	  or	  a	  computer,	  that	  
analyses	  all	  inputs,	  stores	  them	  in	  data	  banks,	  and	  computes	  the	  
best	  actions	  to	  take.	  Either	  the	  brain	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  central	  
command	  for	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  body	  and	  the	  mind	  or,	  
metaphorically,	  it	  is	  the	  computer	  hard	  drive	  that	  keeps	  the	  reality	  show	  software	  going.	  
Both	  the	  wetware	  or	  hardware	  view	  indicate	  we	  could	  be	  learning	  and	  acting	  just	  as	  well	  if	  
our	  conscious	  minds	  were	  ineffectual	  or	  if	  we	  were	  not	  conscious	  at	  all	  since	  unconscious	  
directives	  or	  computations	  are	  all	  that’s	  required.	  
	  
The	  brain-­‐as-­‐selection	  organ	  and	  brain-­‐as-­‐computer	  crowd	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  brain’s	  
plasticity,	  but	  usually	  relegate	  such	  changes	  in	  response	  to	  the	  environment	  as	  occurring	  
before	  birth	  or	  in	  the	  first	  weeks	  of	  a	  child’s	  life.	  The	  mainstream	  neuroscientists	  do,	  of	  
course,	  accept	  the	  brain’s	  evolutionary	  changes	  across	  the	  species	  (meant	  to	  enhance	  
reproductive	  success).ii	  However,	  such	  neuroscientists	  or	  computer	  scientists	  agree	  that	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the	  information	  processing	  structures	  of	  the	  brain	  are	  basically	  unchanging	  after	  the	  infant	  
years,	  one’s	  behaviour	  and	  experience	  are	  determined	  by	  brain	  functioning,	  and	  
consciousness	  is	  most	  often	  understood	  as	  unnecessary	  –	  an	  epiphenomenon	  –	  or	  at	  most	  
an	  after-­‐the-­‐fact	  feedback	  system.	  This	  position	  is	  known	  as	  eliminative	  materialism	  since	  
the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  often	  its	  reality	  are	  eliminated	  by	  recognition	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  
material	  (brain)	  processes.	  Not	  only	  scientists	  but	  also	  influential	  philosophers	  like	  Daniel	  
Dennett	  and	  Patricia	  Churchland	  take	  this	  position.iii	  Note	  that	  the	  mind	  or	  consciousness	  is	  
not	  only	  regarded	  as	  without	  influence	  on	  behaviour	  but	  often	  its	  very	  existence	  is	  in	  
question,	  an	  illusion	  dismissed	  as	  folk	  psychology	  or	  the	  subjective	  position	  taken	  in	  
discourse.	  	  
	  
This	  hard	  science	  view	  of	  brain	  determinism	  seems	  to	  be	  largely	  unknown	  or	  at	  
least	  ignored	  by	  the	  purveyors	  of	  brain-­‐based	  learning.	  It	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  popular	  position	  
among	  educators	  or	  learning	  theoreticians	  because	  it	  implies	  there	  is	  little	  we	  educators	  
can	  do	  to	  change	  a	  mind	  already	  set	  within	  the	  predetermined	  genetics	  of	  a	  particular	  
brain.	  Mental	  experience	  as	  an	  illusion	  of	  the	  deterministic	  brain	  goes	  at	  least	  back	  to	  La	  
Mettrie	  (L'homme	  Machine,	  1748).	  Physiologist	  Pierre	  Jean	  George	  Cabanis	  (1757-­‐1808)	  is	  
said	  to	  have	  written,	  “The	  brain	  secretes	  thought	  as	  the	  liver	  secretes	  bile”	  (in	  Copleston,	  
1961,	  6:51).	  	  
	  
More	  famously,	  Francis	  Crick,	  the	  Nobel-­‐winning	  molecular	  biologist,	  biophysicist,	  
and	  neuroscientist,	  explained	  away	  inner	  experience	  this	  way:	  	  
The	   astonishing	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   “You”,	   your	   joys	   and	   your	   sorrows,	   your	  
memories	   and	   your	   ambitions,	   your	   sense	  of	   personal	   identity	   and	   free	  will,	  
are	   in	   fact	  no	  more	   than	   the	  behaviour	  of	  a	  vast	  assembly	  of	  nerve	  cells	  and	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their	   associated	   molecules.	   As	   Lewis	   Carroll's	   Alice	   might	   have	   phrased	   it:	  
“You're	  nothing	  but	  a	  pack	  of	  neurons!”	  (1994,	  p.	  3)	  
	  
Neuroscientist	  Michael	  Gazzaniga	  (1998),	  known	  for	  his	  pioneering	  work	  with	  split-­‐brain	  
(severed	  corpus	  callosum)	  patients,	  makes	  his	  stance	  against	  the	  brain’s	  plasticity	  quite	  
clear:	  “The	  intriguing	  hypothesis	  that	  real-­‐world	  experience	  sculpts	  neurons	  back	  from	  
their	  exuberant	  growth	  overlooks	  a	  major	  point.	  Most	  exuberance	  and	  subsequent	  pruning	  
happens	  before	  birth,	  leaving	  moot	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	  neural	  development	  is	  under	  
psychological	  guidance”	  (p.	  56).iv	  No	  need	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  choosing	  actions	  to	  guide	  
the	  brain’s	  learning	  from	  the	  deterministic	  neuroscientific	  perspective.	  Gazzaniga	  
continues:	  
Everything	  from	  perceptual	  phenomena	  to	  intuitive	  physics	  to	  social	  exchange	  
rules	   comes	   with	   the	   brain.	   These	   things	   are	   not	   learned;	   they	   are	   innately	  
structured.	   Each	   device	   solves	   a	   different	   problem.	   Not	   to	   recognize	   this	  
simple	  truth	  is	  to	  live	  in	  a	  dream	  world.	  (p.	  170,	  my	  italics)	  
	  
In	  2003,	  outspoken	  neuroscientist	  V.	  S.	  Ramachandran	  began	  his	  Reith	  Lectures	  with	  these	  
remarkable	  words:	  
Even	  though	  it	  is	  common	  knowledge	  these	  days,	  it	  never	  ceases	  to	  amaze	  me	  
that	   all	   the	   richness	   of	   our	   mental	   life	   –	   all	   our	   feelings,	   our	   emotions,	   our	  
thoughts,	  our	  ambitions,	  our	  love	  lives,	  our	  religious	  sentiments	  and	  even	  what	  
each	   of	   us	   regards	   as	   his	   or	   her	   own	   intimate	   private	   self	   –	   is	   simply	   the	  
activities	   of	   these	   little	   specks	   of	   jelly	   in	   our	   heads,	   in	   our	   brains.	   There	   is	  
nothing	  else.	  (Lecture	  1)	  
	  
Clearly,	  in	  this	  situation,	  you	  are	  your	  brain:	  “There	  is	  nothing	  else”.	  Moreover,	  you	  (the	  
conscious	  self)	  are	  not	  the	  central	  command	  or	  even	  an	  influence	  in	  this	  brain	  but	  merely	  a	  
byproduct	  (in	  the	  way	  indicated	  by	  Cabanis	  above)	  –	  since	  it	  seems	  neither	  the	  
environment,	  social	  interactions,	  nor	  personal	  choice	  are	  inputs	  that	  directly	  affect	  your	  
experience	  and	  behaviour,	  at	  least	  until	  these	  things	  have	  been	  appropriately	  processed	  by	  
the	  brain	  and	  indirect	  choices	  made	  for	  you.	  Note	  that	  Ramachandran	  refers	  to	  the	  world-­‐
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creating	  brain	  as	  “common	  knowledge”,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  common	  view	  amongst	  
neuroscientists.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  such	  worldview	  that	  denies	  external	  sources	  of	  
learning	  and	  even	  a	  degree	  of	  human	  free	  will	  could	  be	  in	  any	  way	  amenable	  to	  educators	  
who	  depend	  on	  the	  social	  exchange	  of	  teaching	  and	  learning	  and	  the	  power	  of	  students	  to	  
think	  for	  themselves.	  This	  is	  mainstream	  neuroscience,	  not	  the	  minority	  version	  of	  
neuroscience	  that	  views	  the	  brain	  as	  a	  receptive	  organ	  that	  continually	  changes	  –	  brain	  
plasticity	  throughout	  life	  –	  as	  the	  result	  of	  influences	  from	  the	  body,	  the	  environment,	  or	  
the	  culture.	  
	  
It	  is	  no	  mystery	  why	  those	  who	  benefit	  from	  packaging	  and	  selling	  brain-­‐based	  
learning	  to	  educators	  would	  prefer	  to	  keep	  this	  other,	  non-­‐plastic,	  deterministic	  
perspective	  under	  wraps.	  If	  it	  were	  accepted,	  it	  would	  leave	  little	  for	  educators	  to	  do	  
beyond	  the	  meeting	  of	  basic	  needs,	  information	  transmission	  (still	  the	  mainstay	  of	  
teaching),	  and,	  down	  the	  road,	  such	  physical	  manipulations	  as	  gene	  splicing	  or	  even	  
microscopic	  neural	  transplants,	  probably	  of	  nanochips.	  We	  could	  improve	  the	  wetware	  or	  
hardware,	  but	  the	  brain	  could	  not	  be	  taught	  to	  learn	  better,	  so	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  and	  
traditional	  teaching	  would	  be	  out	  of	  business.	  This	  fear	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  continuing	  
outcry	  against	  the	  studies	  of	  innate	  intelligence	  found	  in	  Herrnstein	  &	  Murray	  (1994)	  and	  
Jensen	  (1998),	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  these	  books	  were	  formidably	  researched.	  It	  leaves	  
one	  wondering	  how	  something	  calling	  itself	  brain-­based	  learning,	  which	  claims	  to	  base	  its	  
methods	  on	  neuroscientific	  research,	  can	  completely	  ignore	  that	  mainstream	  neuroscience	  
denies	  free	  will	  and	  often	  efficacious	  consciousness	  itself.	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   On	  closer	  examination,	  however,	  it	  appears	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  not	  only	  ignores	  a	  
great	  deal	  of	  hard	  neuroscience,	  but	  it	  also	  cherry	  picks	  that	  which	  supports	  an	  already	  
well-­‐established	  program	  of	  teaching	  methods	  that	  looks	  suspiciously	  similar	  to	  the	  
proposals	  of	  progressive	  education	  promulgated	  by	  the	  extraordinary	  mind	  of	  John	  Dewey	  
a	  century	  ago.	  Insofar	  as	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  returns	  the	  educational	  focus	  to	  individual	  
development,	  novelty,	  and	  interpersonal	  practices,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  applauded;	  however,	  one	  still	  
wonders	  why	  it	  was	  considered	  necessary	  to	  side	  track	  into	  brain	  science	  to	  bring	  about	  
changes	  most	  thinking	  educators	  already	  agree	  are	  positive.	  Choosing	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  
plasticity	  of	  the	  brain	  with	  its	  mutable	  and	  interactive	  neural	  assemblies	  responsive	  to	  
experience	  in	  the	  world,	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  leaves	  itself	  with	  an	  approach	  that	  pretends	  
to	  focus	  on	  teaching	  to	  the	  brain	  but,	  in	  most	  cases,	  is	  instead	  still	  teaching	  to	  the	  mind	  –	  
and	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  –	  or	  to	  the	  community.	  Dynamic	  neural	  maps	  indicating	  new	  
learning	  may	  be	  less	  a	  product	  of	  well-­‐functioning	  cerebral	  structures	  than	  interiorized	  
reflections	  of	  interactive	  human	  experience	  in	  the	  world,	  that	  is,	  the	  neural	  changes	  may	  
reveal	  experiential	  changes	  as	  they	  happen.	  
	  
It	  should	  make	  educators	  uneasy	  that	  an	  area	  identifying	  itself	  as	  brain-­‐based	  
learning	  has	  such	  uncertain	  neuroscience	  to	  back	  it	  up.	  Sources	  are	  certainly	  found	  in	  
theoretic	  cognitive	  science,	  but	  these	  are	  rarely	  backed	  up	  by	  concrete	  experimental	  
evidence.	  Neuroscience	  deals	  with	  the	  most	  complex	  organ	  in	  the	  human	  body,	  and	  its	  
relation	  to	  human	  experience	  in	  the	  world	  is	  even	  more	  complex,	  so	  it	  should	  be	  no	  
surprise	  to	  learn	  that	  it	  is	  still	  a	  developing	  field.	  John	  Bruer	  stated,	  “Brain	  science	  …	  can	  
tell	  us	  very	  little	  about	  how	  the	  brain	  learns	  and	  it	  is	  far	  too	  early	  to	  take	  what	  we	  know	  at	  
this	  point	  and	  plug	  it	  into	  our	  curriculum”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Gabriel	  (2001,	  p.	  1).	  In	  the	  years	  
10
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since,	  it	  seems	  neuroscience	  has	  moved	  even	  more	  stubbornly	  into	  the	  mechanistic	  
materialist	  worldview,	  which	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  exactly	  what	  version	  of	  neuroscience	  
brain-­‐based	  learning	  is	  itself	  based	  upon.	  
	  
Brain	  Imaging.	  Still,	  enough	  is	  known	  about	  the	  brain’s	  seemingly	  modular	  construction	  
and	  its	  extraordinary	  electrochemical	  interactions	  for	  theoreticians	  and	  neuroscientists	  to	  
imagine	  that	  the	  brain	  is	  learning	  when	  it	  may	  only	  be	  adapting	  to	  environmental	  
circumstances.	  It	  should	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  most	  of	  what	  we	  know	  about	  the	  brain’s	  
activity	  is	  through	  recently	  invented	  brain-­‐imaging	  techniques.v	  Calling	  these	  techniques	  
the	  new	  phrenology,	  Noë	  (2009)	  declares,	  “It	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  overstate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
the	  fervor	  about	  the	  brain-­‐based	  view	  of	  consciousness	  is	  driven	  by	  the	  development	  in	  the	  
last	  few	  years	  of	  new	  technologies	  of	  brain	  imaging”	  (2009,	  p.	  19).	  Noë	  goes	  on:	  
Brain	  scans	  thus	  represent	  the	  mind	  at	  three	  steps	  of	  removal:	  they	  represent	  
physical	   magnitudes	   correlated	   to	   blood	   flow;	   the	   blood	   flow	   in	   turn	   is	  
correlated	   to	   neural	   activity;	   the	   neural	   activity	   in	   turn	   is	   supposed	   to	  
correlate	   to	  mental	   activity.	   If	   all	   the	   assumptions	   are	   accurate,	   a	   brain-­‐scan	  
image	  may	   contain	   important	   information	   about	   neural	   activity	   related	   to	   a	  
cognitive	   process.	   But	   we	   need	   to	   take	   care	   not	   to	   be	  misled	   by	   the	   visual,	  
pictorial	   character	   of	   these	   images.	  Brain	   scans	   are	  not	   pictures	   of	   cognitive	  
processes	  of	  the	  brain	  in	  action.	  (p.	  24)	  
	  
Noë	  also	  observes	  that,	  because	  the	  brain	  is	  always	  active	  and	  these	  scans	  indicate	  all	  sorts	  
of	  things	  going	  on	  during	  different	  experiences	  or	  physical	  events,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  
identify	  with	  certainty	  what	  electrochemical	  activity	  equates	  with	  what	  experience	  or	  
event,	  especially	  because	  most	  of	  what	  the	  brain	  does	  is	  never	  associated	  with	  
consciousness.	  Indeed,	  when	  brain	  activity	  is	  observed	  while	  the	  patient	  is	  rendered	  
unconscious,	  electrical	  activity	  seems	  to	  increase	  in	  a	  chaotic	  fashion,	  rather	  than	  decrease	  
as	  might	  be	  expected	  (ScienceDaily,	  2011).	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The	  unidentified	  author	  of	  the	  ScienceDaily	  (2011)	  article	  quotes	  the	  words	  of	  Brian	  
Pollard,	  Professor	  of	  Anesthesia	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Manchester,	  which	  precisely	  reflect	  the	  
errors	  of	  presumption	  found	  in	  scientism:	  “We	  are	  currently	  working	  on	  trying	  to	  interpret	  
the	  changes	  that	  we	  have	  observed.”	  This	  is	  the	  key	  admission	  of	  the	  article	  and	  tells	  us,	  in	  
general,	  how	  little	  brain	  imaging	  techniques	  reveal	  about	  our	  conscious	  experience	  or	  its	  
loss.	  No	  matter	  what	  the	  scientists	  see	  on	  their	  screens,	  it	  is	  still	  educated	  speculation	  to	  
relate	  the	  electronic	  imaging	  of	  brain	  activity	  to	  actual	  human	  experience.	  All	  the	  scanning	  
blips	  or	  colourful	  images	  depend	  on	  their	  interpretation	  by	  a	  human	  mind	  that	  must	  use	  
words	  to	  express	  meaning.	  It	  is	  not	  brain	  activity	  that	  is	  central	  here,	  but	  its	  conscious	  
interpretation.	  In	  short,	  brain-­‐imaging	  techniques	  may	  represent	  the	  brain	  in	  action	  but	  not	  
the	  mind	  in	  action.	  All	  scans	  and	  images	  must	  be	  interpreted	  by	  an	  observing	  human	  mind,	  
which	  has	  its	  own	  expectations	  and	  biases,	  including	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  watching	  a	  
mind	  when	  it	  is	  really	  observing	  only	  the	  varied	  electrochemical	  activity	  of	  a	  brain.	  In	  a	  
convincing	  assessment,	  Legrenzi	  and	  Umilta	  (2011)	  argue	  that	  brain	  scans	  do	  not	  
differentiate	  between	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  phenomena,	  so	  cannot	  represent	  human	  
cognition	  or	  psychological	  experience.	  However,	  colourful	  brain	  images	  perpetuated	  in	  the	  
media	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  equating	  the	  person	  with	  the	  brain	  or	  body,	  and	  this	  may	  have	  a	  
number	  of	  sociopolitical	  consequences,	  including	  a	  tendency	  toward	  top-­‐down	  
totalitarianism	  (society	  mimicking	  the	  body)	  and	  identifying	  personal	  lived	  experience	  
with	  the	  life	  functions	  of	  the	  body.	  	  	  
	  
Problems	  with	  Plasticity.	  Still,	  even	  without	  depending	  on	  brain	  imagery,	  it	  seems	  all	  
brain-­‐based	  learning	  needs	  is	  the	  widely-­‐supported	  theory	  that	  the	  brain	  is	  plastic,	  that	  it	  
can	  learn	  from	  its	  inputs	  –	  activities	  of	  the	  body,	  events	  in	  the	  environment,	  personal	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experiences,	  and	  relationships.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  enough	  to	  convince	  many	  that	  we	  can	  
teach	  the	  brain	  to	  learn	  better.	  It’s	  only	  natural	  that	  educators	  prefer	  the	  brain’s	  plasticity	  
and	  neural	  constructivism	  to	  the	  neural	  determinism	  of	  eliminative	  materialism	  (and	  I	  
believe	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  for	  such	  a	  preference).	  However,	  embracing	  neural	  plasticity	  
raises	  other	  questions	  that	  put	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  in	  an	  uncomfortable	  position.	  
If	  the	  brain	  is	  so	  plastic	  or	  constructive	  that	  it	  responds	  to	  embodied	  experience	  in	  an	  
environment,	  then	  the	  brain	  is	  an	  organ	  of	  response	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  an	  organ	  that	  
determines	  response	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  or	  of	  experience	  itself).	  In	  fact,	  the	  
brain	  evolved	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  environment.	  Furthermore,	  as	  human	  
experience	  broke	  across	  the	  symbolic	  threshold	  (Deacon,	  1997)	  into	  language,	  growth	  in	  
certain	  cerebral	  lobes	  or	  modules	  like	  the	  prefrontal	  cortex	  became	  necessary	  when	  new	  
neural	  pathways	  were	  needed	  as	  speech	  developed	  and	  spread.	  Culture	  changed	  the	  brain	  
or,	  as	  Deacon	  (1997)	  put	  it,	  language	  and	  the	  brain	  co-­evolved.	  Today	  the	  brain	  may	  
continue	  to	  be	  as	  much	  a	  responsive	  organ	  (exquisitely	  complex	  as	  it	  may	  be)	  as	  a	  
determining	  organ;	  but,	  if	  this	  is	  so,	  what	  have	  we	  to	  gain	  by	  studying	  its	  exquisite	  
complexities?	  If	  embodied	  experience	  in	  an	  environment	  –	  including	  an	  abstract	  cultural	  
environment	  –	  can	  change	  the	  brain’s	  neural	  codes	  then	  why	  not	  do	  the	  obvious	  and	  
continue	  to	  learn	  from	  guided	  embodied	  experience	  in	  a	  rich	  learning	  environment,	  as	  the	  
best	  schools	  have	  done	  for	  hundreds	  of	  years?	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  persons	  make	  choices,	  such	  
choices	  are	  reflected	  in	  brains	  but	  not	  caused	  by	  them.	  Why	  study	  the	  brain	  when	  it	  can	  
only	  reflect	  our	  own	  teaching	  and	  learning	  back	  to	  us?	  
	  
This	  seems	  an	  important	  question	  for	  brain-­‐based	  educators.	  If	  the	  brain	  is	  not	  
plastic,	  then	  it	  need	  only	  be	  genetically	  manipulated	  by	  improved	  technology	  for	  better	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learning	  to	  take	  place.	  If	  the	  brain	  is	  plastic,	  we	  have	  more	  to	  gain	  learning	  about	  what	  we	  
do	  with	  each	  other	  in	  the	  world	  and	  less	  to	  gain	  by	  discovering	  exactly	  how	  learning	  
changes	  our	  neural	  codes.	  	  
	  
But	  the	  problems	  do	  not	  stop	  here.	  Returning	  to	  philosophy	  and	  the	  question	  of	  Are	  
you	  your	  brain?	  we	  will	  see	  how	  conscious	  experience	  –	  the	  “you”	  you	  know	  yourself	  to	  be	  –	  
continues	  to	  defy	  an	  explanation	  based	  in	  cerebral	  processes,	  objective-­‐materialism,	  or	  
scientism	  of	  any	  sort.	  The	  explanatory	  gap	  between	  conscious	  experience	  and	  brain	  
function	  remains,	  leaving	  the	  source	  of	  your	  conscious	  self-­‐identity	  open	  to	  speculation.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  objectivist	  worldview	  of	  classical	  physics	  has	  not	  budged	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
the	  farther	  reaches	  of	  physics	  –	  discovering	  that,	  at	  the	  quantum	  level,	  the	  observer	  directly	  
affects	  what	  is	  observed.	  These	  will	  be	  briefly	  surveyed	  in	  what	  follows.	  
	  
Why	  You	  Are	  Not	  Your	  Brain	  
The	  Car	  and	  the	  Driver.	  Many	  will	  say,	  “Of	  course	  I	  am	  not	  my	  brain,	  but	  I	  need	  my	  
brain	  in	  the	  same	  way	  a	  driver	  needs	  a	  car.	  The	  car	  is	  not	  the	  driver,	  but	  it	  may	  help	  me	  to	  
get	  where	  I	  am	  going	  if	  I	  better	  understand	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  automobile.	  So	  it	  is	  with	  the	  
brain.	  Knowing	  how	  it	  works	  will	  help	  me,	  the	  learner,	  to	  learn	  more,	  learn	  faster,	  and	  
retain	  it	  better.”	  This	  reasoning	  is,	  however,	  faulty	  and	  depends	  on	  several	  unverifiable	  
assumptions.	  First,	  the	  driver	  does	  not	  need	  to	  know	  how	  the	  car	  works	  to	  make	  it	  drive	  
from	  place	  to	  place.	  Second,	  cars	  are	  built	  by	  people,	  so	  their	  functioning	  manifests	  the	  
work	  of	  many	  human	  minds	  working	  together	  in	  various	  roles.	  Human	  brains	  always	  work	  
together	  with	  other	  brains.	  This	  working	  together	  already	  exceeds	  the	  capacity	  of	  any	  single	  
isolated	  human	  brain;	  it	  is	  the	  medium	  of	  human	  symbolic	  communication	  that	  links	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brains,	  but,	  note	  that	  this	  medium	  is	  not	  made	  of	  neurons,	  axons,	  dendrites,	  cerebral	  lobes,	  
or	  even	  neural	  assemblies.	  This	  medium	  is	  human	  culture	  and	  its	  technological	  extensions;	  
culture	  is	  more	  the	  source	  of	  the	  self	  and	  the	  world	  we	  experience	  as	  our	  core	  reality	  than	  
is	  the	  brain.	  The	  car	  does	  not	  drive	  me;	  I	  drive	  it.	  
	  
Experience	  or	  consciousness	  is	  always	  first	  and	  last,	  as	  radical	  constructivism	  and	  
phenomenology	  have	  taught	  us.	  It	  is	  what	  we	  are	  and	  the	  true	  bottom	  line	  of	  knowing	  and	  
learning.	  We	  will	  never	  find	  the	  smallest	  bit	  of	  reality	  in	  matter	  –	  be	  it	  a	  subatomic	  particle,	  
quark,	  or	  cosmic	  string	  –	  for	  the	  final	  fact	  is	  always	  our	  knowledge	  or	  experience	  of	  a	  
postulated	  object.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  I	  am	  my	  brain,	  but	  there	  is	  also	  a	  sense	  in	  
which	  I	  am	  my	  body;	  and,	  because	  that	  body	  intermingles	  with	  a	  world,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  
which	  I	  am	  the	  world	  (as	  a	  living	  microcosm	  of	  it).	  But	  what	  we	  most	  immediately	  and	  
obviously	  know	  ourselves	  to	  be	  is	  our	  own	  awareness,	  which	  is	  identical	  with	  our	  being.vi	  If	  
we	  were	  unaware,	  we	  would	  neither	  exist	  nor	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  existence.	  We	  would	  not	  be.	  
Consciousness	  matters,	  or	  we	  would	  be	  nothing	  at	  all.	  To	  those	  who	  insist	  they	  are	  not	  their	  
brains,	  yet	  insist	  that	  understanding	  the	  brain’s	  parts	  and	  functioning	  in	  minute	  detail	  will	  
make	  them	  better,	  smarter,	  and	  wiser,	  I	  note	  the	  contradiction:	  Learning	  all	  about	  
automobiles	  and	  their	  workings	  –	  even	  improving	  on	  such	  workings	  –	  will	  not	  make	  me	  a	  
better,	  smarter,	  wiser	  driver.	  Only	  my	  will	  and	  choices	  can	  do	  that.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  I	  admit	  
that	  a	  deficient	  automobile	  (or	  a	  deficient	  brain)	  that	  can	  be	  repaired	  should	  be	  repaired.	  
With	  technological	  (or	  bioengineered)	  enhancements,	  my	  range	  of	  my	  abilities	  might	  be	  
extended.	  The	  point,	  however,	  is	  that	  driving	  skills	  are	  not	  taught	  to	  automobiles,	  and	  
thinking	  skills	  are	  not	  taught	  to	  brains.	  Both	  are	  taught	  to	  persons	  whose	  cars	  or	  brains	  
then	  adapt	  accordingly.	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The	  Quantum	  Observer	  Effect.	  Without	  delving	  deeply	  into	  the	  complex	  subject	  of	  
quantum	  physics	  (often	  confusingly	  called	  quantum	  mechanics	  since	  it	  is	  ultimately	  a	  
reality	  only	  known	  via	  arcane	  mathematics),	  I	  wish	  only	  to	  point	  out	  that	  in	  the	  last	  century	  
at	  subatomic	  levels	  the	  observer	  was	  shown	  to	  affect	  what	  was	  being	  observed,	  though	  
materialists	  to	  this	  day	  struggle	  to	  find	  a	  way	  around	  this	  conundrum	  (e.g.,	  Hawking	  &	  
Mlodinow,	  2010).	  The	  observer	  effect,	  accepted	  by	  the	  Copenhagen	  School	  of	  quantum	  
interpretation,	  notes	  the	  speed	  and	  position	  of	  certain	  subatomic	  particles	  or	  photons	  
cannot	  be	  measured	  simultaneously	  (the	  famous	  uncertainty	  principle	  of	  Heisenberg).	  To	  
observe	  or	  measure	  one	  leaves	  the	  other	  indeterminate.	  Whichever	  is	  chosen,	  the	  other	  will	  
become	  unknowable.	  Before	  observation,	  it	  is	  surmised	  that	  reality	  consists	  of	  chaotic	  
quantum	  fields	  of	  indeterminate	  waves	  held	  in	  a	  superposition	  of	  potential	  form.	  Only	  upon	  
observation	  does	  the	  wave	  of	  near-­‐infinite	  possibilityvii	  collapse	  into	  a	  definable	  form	  that	  
allows	  either	  position	  or	  momentum	  to	  be	  measured.viii	  Some	  sort	  of	  observer	  must	  be	  
present	  for	  reality	  (as	  we	  know	  it)	  to	  exist.	  The	  observer,	  usually	  understood	  as	  a	  mind	  in	  
some	  form,	  cannot	  simply	  be	  dismissed	  from	  the	  worldview	  of	  physics.	  
	  
These	  thoughts,	  of	  course,	  are	  simplifications	  by	  a	  non-­‐specialist,	  but	  they	  do	  
indicate	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  participation	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  real	  world	  that	  
actually	  takes	  place	  with	  each	  observation.	  If	  matter,	  at	  its	  most	  fundamental	  level,	  is	  
changed	  by	  conscious	  observation	  (as	  the	  quantum	  observer	  effect	  indicates)	  then	  matter	  
(including	  brain	  matter)	  cannot	  be	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  the	  conscious	  observer.	  This	  
strange	  state	  of	  affairs	  has	  been	  known	  for	  more	  than	  a	  century,	  yet	  has	  been	  largely	  
ignored	  by	  mainstream	  science,	  likely	  because	  it	  appears	  to	  directly	  contradict	  the	  
materialist	  worldview.	  It	  seems	  that	  conscious	  beings	  are	  neither	  separate	  substances	  from	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matter	  (as	  in	  Cartesian	  dualism),	  nor	  merely	  passive	  observers	  of	  a	  pre-­‐established,	  
exterior,	  material	  reality	  (including	  the	  brain),	  as	  in	  scientific	  dualism.	  Mind	  and	  matter	  
might	  co-­‐create,	  mutually	  implicated	  in	  each	  other.	  	  
	   	  
The	  Explanatory	  Gap.	  The	  source	  of	  awareness	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  question	  to	  answer,	  
especially	  since	  philosopher	  David	  Chalmers	  (1995)	  made	  famous	  the	  distinction	  between	  
the	  “easy”	  problems	  and	  the	  “hard”	  problem	  of	  consciousness.	  The	  easy	  problems	  can	  
potentially	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  examination	  of	  brain	  activity,	  which	  includes	  most	  of	  the	  
content	  of	  consciousness.	  The	  hard	  problem,	  however,	  is	  how	  and	  why	  consciousness	  
exists	  at	  all.	  To	  this	  point,	  neuroscience	  has	  been	  no	  help	  in	  explaining	  this	  existential	  fact:	  
“The	  really	  hard	  problem	  of	  consciousness	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  experience”	  (Chalmers,	  p.	  200).	  
This	  difference	  –	  otherwise	  known	  as	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  –	  was	  noted	  as	  far	  back	  as	  1879	  
when	  psycho-­‐neurologist	  John	  Tyndall	  conceptualized	  the	  impossible	  rift:	  	  
The	   passage	   from	   the	   physics	   of	   the	   brain	   to	   the	   corresponding	   facts	   of	  
consciousness	   is	  unthinkable.	   	  Granted	   that	   a	  definite	   thought	   and	  a	  definite	  
molecular	   action	   in	   the	   brain	   occur	   simultaneously;	   we	   do	   not	   possess	   the	  
intellectual	   organ,	   nor	   apparently	   any	   rudiment	   of	   the	   organ,	   which	   would	  
enable	  us	   to	  pass,	  by	  a	  process	  of	  reasoning,	   from	  one	  to	   the	  other.	   (Cited	   in	  
Seager,	  p.	  272)	  
	  
The	  recognition	  of	  the	  explanatory	  gap	  between	  lived	  experience	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  
brain	  has	  been	  long	  recognized.	  Even	  if	  neural	  correlates	  of	  consciousness	  (NCCs)	  are	  found	  
in	  the	  brain,	  there	  will	  still	  be	  no	  explanation	  how	  they	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  immediacy	  of	  
conscious	  experience.	  This	  gap	  has	  been	  solace	  for	  the	  spiritual	  minded	  who	  wish	  to	  
believe	  in	  a	  detachable	  soul,	  but	  this	  belief	  leads	  only	  back	  into	  the	  incompatibilities	  of	  
dualism	  (not	  to	  mention	  wishful-­‐thinking).	  The	  only	  sensible	  choice	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  
material	  and,	  for	  lack	  of	  a	  better	  term,	  the	  mental	  are	  one	  elemental	  substance	  or	  process.	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In	  some	  way,	  experience	  and	  the	  material	  world	  in	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves	  are	  mutually	  
implicated	  in	  each	  other,	  a	  position	  that	  certainly	  includes	  the	  apparent	  anomalies	  of	  
quantum	  physics.	  
	  
Philosophical	  phenomenology	  begins	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  lived	  experience	  (as	  
opposed	  to	  beginning	  with	  an	  objective	  external	  world)	  and	  has	  long	  understood	  world	  and	  
conscious	  experience	  to	  be	  co-­‐creative.	  Phenomenologist	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  (1968)	  observed	  
that	  both	  subjective	  experience	  and	  the	  material	  world	  are	  mutually	  united	  in	  an	  
observable	  dance.	  Radical	  constructivism	  (e.g.,	  Goodman,	  1978)	  understands	  the	  world	  as	  
constructed	  by	  the	  unconscious	  consensus	  of	  all	  minds.	  Panpsychism	  (cf.	  Skrbina,	  2005)	  or	  
panexperientialism	  (cf.	  Nixon,	  2010)	  are	  attempts	  to	  grant	  all	  material	  reality	  varied	  levels	  
of	  consciousness	  or	  at	  least	  experience.	  	  
	  
Hawking	  and	  Mlodinow	  (2010)	  went	  far	  enough	  in	  this	  direction	  to	  accept	  that	  any	  
number	  of	  cosmic	  theories	  might	  be	  true	  depending	  on	  the	  consistency	  and	  coherence	  of	  
the	  model	  constructed	  to	  interpret	  reality.	  However,	  they	  made	  certain	  that,	  despite	  their	  
model-­dependent	  realism,	  the	  traditional	  worldview	  of	  objective-­‐materialism	  was	  still	  
granted	  primacy	  (though	  certain	  intellectual	  contortions	  were	  required).	  The	  mind-­‐
independent	  worldview	  of	  objective	  materialism	  becomes	  hard	  to	  defend	  when	  it	  is	  
simultaneously	  accepted	  that	  mind	  (the	  observer)	  is	  a	  necessary	  participant	  in	  reality	  (as	  
model-­‐dependent	  realism	  suggests).	  As	  I	  wrote	  elsewhere:	  “To	  objectify	  a	  mind-­‐
independent	  reality,	  then	  to	  look	  for	  mind	  in	  that	  mind-­‐independent	  reality,	  is	  a	  bizarre	  
sort	  of	  logic	  to	  say	  the	  least”	  (Nixon,	  1997,	  p.	  16).	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   I	  recognize	  these	  philosophical	  speculations	  are	  out	  there	  for	  many	  and	  provide	  no	  
incentive	  to	  consider	  themselves	  anything	  but	  manifestations	  of	  their	  brains.	  Even	  with	  a	  
panpsychist	  worldview,	  there	  is	  still	  reason	  to	  study	  how	  brains	  learn	  because	  brains	  might	  
be	  the	  only	  way	  that	  panpsychic	  (universal)	  awareness	  achieves	  knowledge,	  intelligence,	  or	  
selfhood.	  	  
	  
	   The	  Intersubjective	  Brain.	  Simply	  put,	  we	  are	  not	  born	  with	  knowledge,	  
intelligence,	  or	  selfhood.	  In	  fact,	  we	  must	  interact	  with	  others	  and	  the	  world	  to	  learn	  to	  
perceive	  and	  understand	  what	  is	  perceived	  through	  our	  senses	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Sacks,	  1995).	  We	  
don’t	  exist	  as	  conscious	  selves	  first	  and	  then	  learn	  to	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  selves	  
through	  a	  theory	  of	  mind.ix	  Evidence	  from	  language	  studies	  points	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  
called	  into	  selfhood	  by	  others	  who	  have	  already	  attained	  such	  selfhood	  within	  the	  milieu	  of	  
a	  symbolically	  interactive	  culture	  (e.g.,	  Heyneman,	  1992).	  In	  other	  words,	  interpersonal	  
relationships	  take	  place	  before	  there	  is	  a	  self-­‐identified	  person	  within	  us	  (though	  obviously	  
we	  experience	  sensual	  body	  awareness).	  This	  primary	  intersubjectivity	  (e.g.,	  Gallagher,	  
2001)	  calls	  forth	  subjectivity;	  culture	  creates	  the	  space	  for	  the	  self	  to	  emerge	  and	  develop,	  
which	  self	  will	  then	  contribute	  to	  and	  alter	  the	  culture	  within	  which	  it	  began.	  This	  self	  is	  
who	  you	  are,	  even	  though	  self-­‐conception	  is	  a	  process	  that	  began	  by	  identifying	  with	  others	  
first.	  
	  
Why	  does	  this	  matter?	  Because	  it	  indicates	  you	  are	  not	  your	  brain	  but,	  instead,	  you	  
extend	  well	  beyond	  it	  into	  the	  world	  to	  mingle	  with	  the	  minds	  of	  others.	  Your	  senses	  
connect	  you	  with	  the	  natural	  world	  of	  which	  you	  are	  a	  part,	  and	  our	  culturally	  invented	  
codes	  of	  communication	  allow	  us	  to	  breach	  the	  barrier	  of	  the	  skull	  to	  connect	  with	  each	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other	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  often	  immaterial	  or	  at	  least	  invisible,	  though	  such	  symbolic	  
communications	  may	  take	  concrete	  forms.	  As	  linguist	  Wallace	  Chafe	  (1994)	  put	  it:	  “When	  
language	  is	  made	  overt,	  as	  in	  speaking	  and	  writing,	  it	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  link	  between	  what	  
would	  otherwise	  be	  independent	  nervous	  systems,	  acting	  as	  an	  imperfect	  substitute	  for	  the	  
synapses	  that	  fail	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  from	  one	  mind	  to	  another”	  (p.	  41).	  How	  obvious	  this	  
has	  become	  in	  our	  time	  of	  electronic	  connectivity	  and	  shared	  imagery!	  
	  
Noë	  (2009)	  adds	  that	  the	  neural	  plasticity	  required	  by	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  may	  at	  
least	  partially	  originate	  in	  the	  requirement	  that	  brains	  respond	  to	  the	  variety	  of	  languages	  
we	  speak	  or	  to	  the	  textured	  complexity	  of	  any	  of	  our	  forms	  of	  communication:	  	  
Neural	  plasticity,	  properly	  understood,	  teaches	  us	  that	  the	  brain	  can	  never	  be	  
the	  whole	  story	  about	  our	  mental	  development.	  Our	  linguistic	  capacity	  …	  is	  not	  
a	   product	   of	   a	   particular	   neural	   structure.	   Language	   is	   a	   shared	   cultural	  
practice	   that	   can	   only	   be	   learned	   by	   a	   person	  who	   is	   one	   among	  many	   in	   a	  
special	  kind	  of	  cultural	  ecosystem.	  (p.	  52)	  
	  
The	  intersubjective	  mind	  implies	  that	  our	  vaunted	  sense	  of	  a	  central	  command	  self	  
somewhere	  in	  the	  brain	  is	  an	  exaggeration.	  Our	  
identities	  literally	  consist	  of	  each	  other,	  as	  
hermeneutic	  philosopher	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  has	  indicated	  
in	  his	  complex	  exploration	  Oneself	  as	  Another	  (1995).	  
Thus,	  our	  choices	  are	  always	  intricately	  intertwined	  
with	  the	  choices	  of	  others	  (perhaps	  difficult	  for	  our	  
proud	  individualism	  to	  accept).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  not	  only	  are	  we	  not	  our	  brains,	  we	  
are	  not	  even	  the	  independent,	  isolated	  minds	  we	  each	  feel	  we	  are.	  (See	  the	  figure	  of	  
Phenomenological	  Fields	  of	  Knowing,	  at	  left.)	  With	  multitudes	  within,	  free	  will	  is	  
impossible	  if	  by	  free	  will	  we	  mean	  choices	  made	  without	  causes.	  However,	  the	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intersubjective	  mind	  is	  subject	  to	  such	  a	  panoply	  of	  influences	  –	  from	  the	  past	  and	  future,	  
from	  all	  other	  minds	  –	  that	  subjective	  free	  will	  must	  be	  active	  to	  choose	  which	  potential	  
causes	  will	  be	  become	  actual	  in	  behaviour	  or	  the	  person	  would	  disperse	  in	  a	  chaos	  of	  
contradictions.x	  
	  
Noë	  agrees	  that	  we	  are	  not	  our	  brains	  (as	  his	  very	  subtitle	  –	  Why	  You	  Are	  Not	  Your	  
Brain	  –	  indicates),	  and	  I	  agree	  that	  the	  brain	  is	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  (as	  the	  logicians	  
say)	  for	  conscious	  selfhood,	  thought,	  and	  learning.	  Noë	  insists	  we	  are	  instead	  equal	  parts	  
brain,	  body,	  and	  world,	  with	  the	  latter	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  previous	  two.	  I	  would	  insist	  
that	  symbolic	  culture	  should	  be	  added	  to	  his	  trinity	  to	  make	  a	  quaternity	  because	  
conceptual	  self-­‐identity	  originates	  from	  an	  abstract	  world	  of	  its	  own.	  Noë	  states	  the	  brain	  
responds	  to	  the	  person	  playing	  it	  in	  an	  environment.	  In	  the	  same	  way:	  
Brains	  don’t	  think.	  The	  idea	  that	  a	  brain	  could	  represent	  the	  world	  on	  its	  own	  
doesn’t	  make	  any	  more	  sense	  than	  the	  idea	  that	  mere	  marks	  on	  a	  paper	  could	  
signify	  all	  on	  their	  own	  (that	   is,	   independently	  of	  the	  larger	  social	  practice	  of	  
reading	  and	  writing).	  The	  world	  shows	  up	  for	  us	  thanks	  to	  our	  interaction	  with	  
it.	  It	  is	  not	  made	  in	  the	  brain	  or	  by	  the	  brain.	  (p.	  164)	  
	  
Back	  to	  Ontology.	  The	  mechanisms	  of	  human	  consciousness	  often	  seem	  correlated	  
with	  neural	  activity	  in	  imaging	  scans,	  but	  discerning	  which	  activity	  correlates	  with	  
consciousness	  and	  which	  with	  the	  unconscious	  is	  not	  yet	  a	  possibility.	  Correlation	  with	  
non-­‐human	  animal	  consciousness	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  impossible	  because	  animals	  cannot	  
report	  their	  conscious	  states.	  Intersubjectivity	  already	  shows	  us	  that	  conscious	  self-­‐identity	  
may	  be	  the	  link	  between	  brains	  that	  we	  call	  culture,	  carried	  along	  extra-­‐neural	  pathways	  of	  
symbolic	  communication.	  Philosophical	  phenomenology	  and	  social	  psychology	  indicate	  
that	  the	  intersubjective	  connection	  among	  many	  people	  seems	  more	  likely	  to	  explain	  
human	  consciousness	  than	  does	  the	  reduction	  of	  such	  consciousness	  to	  neural	  states;	  if	  this	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is	  the	  case,	  materialism	  can	  itself	  be	  eliminated	  as	  the	  explanation	  for	  consciousness.	  In	  fact,	  
it’s	  beginning	  to	  appear	  that	  individual	  human	  consciousness	  is	  part	  of	  something	  much	  
larger	  rather	  than	  reducible	  to	  a	  mere	  epiphenomenon	  of	  a	  biological	  function.	  
The	  explanatory	  gap	  indicates	  that	  science	  cannot	  conceivably	  explain	  the	  hard	  problem	  of	  
awareness	  in	  itself,	  of	  which	  human	  consciousness	  may	  be	  but	  one	  manifestation.	  Such	  
awareness	  –	  known	  as	  psyche	  in	  certain	  Western	  traditionsxi	  –	  would	  include	  the	  
unconscious	  but	  responsive	  experience	  of	  human	  beings,	  other	  animals,	  and	  other	  life	  
forms.	  In	  truth,	  there	  is	  no	  logical	  reason	  to	  exclude	  that	  which	  science	  regards	  as	  inorganic	  
(as	  Eastern	  philosophy	  has	  long	  understood),	  for	  at	  what	  point	  could	  we	  say	  that	  
awareness	  enters	  the	  material	  world?	  No	  entry	  point	  is	  conceivable,	  so	  we	  may	  have	  to	  face	  
the	  notion	  that	  all	  existence	  is	  (in	  a	  sense	  that	  still	  escapes	  our	  limitations)	  alive	  and	  aware.	  
The	  quantum	  observer	  effect	  seems	  to	  hint	  at	  just	  such	  an	  extraordinary,	  if	  literally	  
inexplicable,	  reality.	  
	  
Materialism	  (reductive,	  mechanistic,	  and	  objective)	  is	  a	  monistic	  (singular)	  ontology;	  
that	  is,	  it	  takes	  for	  granted	  that	  all	  existence	  is	  one	  thing,	  in	  this	  case	  non-­‐living	  matter	  and	  
the	  related	  interactions	  of	  measurable	  (material)	  energy.	  Idealism,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
basically	  believes	  in	  an	  ultimately	  spiritual	  ontology	  out	  of	  which	  the	  material	  world	  is	  
created.	  Materialism	  is	  objective	  and	  idealism	  is	  subjective,	  so	  we	  have	  the	  basic	  split	  of	  
human	  consciousness	  reified	  in	  our	  metaphysics.	  But	  other	  endeavours	  conceive	  an	  
ontology,	  i.e.,	  an	  ultimate	  reality,	  that	  attempt	  to	  escape	  this	  dualism.	  Dual-­‐aspect	  monism	  
is	  an	  attempt	  to	  imagine	  one	  reality	  with	  aspects	  of	  both	  mind	  and	  matter	  (two	  sides	  of	  one	  
coin),	  but	  the	  problem	  of	  imagining	  one	  reality	  apart	  from	  its	  aspects	  remains	  unsolved.	  
Perhaps	  mind	  and	  matter	  (or	  spirit	  and	  material)	  are	  ultimately	  the	  same	  thing	  (neutral	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monism),xii	  where	  ultimate	  reality	  is	  imagined	  as	  neither	  matter	  nor	  mind	  and	  is	  in	  effect	  
neutral	  and	  panpsychism,	  which	  sees	  matter	  as	  embodied	  psyche	  (e.g.,	  Skrbina,	  2005).	  	  
But	  providing	  an	  acceptable	  alternative	  to	  materialism	  is	  not	  my	  purpose,	  though	  I	  want	  to	  
point	  out	  that	  our	  current	  predominant	  worldview	  –	  which,	  as	  noted,	  many	  scientists	  
consider	  proven	  –	  is	  not	  the	  only	  conceivable	  ontology.	  Ultimate	  reality	  may	  not	  be	  
knowable	  by	  us	  speaking	  primates	  on	  this	  planet,	  but	  our	  finest	  philosophers	  have	  not	  
abandoned	  the	  attempt	  to	  find	  words	  to	  indicate	  what	  is,	  by	  definition,	  beyond	  words.	  
Merleau-­‐Ponty	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  invisible	  to	  lead	  us	  –	  via	  negativa	  –	  toward	  this	  
intangible,	  inconceivable	  ultimate:	  
It	  is	  …	  not	  a	  de	  facto	  invisible,	  like	  an	  object	  hidden	  behind	  another,	  and	  not	  an	  
absolute	  invisible,	  which	  would	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  visible.	  Rather	  it	  is	  
the	   invisible	   of	   this	   world,	   that	   which	   inhabits	   this	   world,	   sustains	   it,	   and	  
renders	   it	  visible,	   its	  own	  and	   interior	  possibility,	   the	  Being	  of	   this	  being.	   (p.	  
151)	  
	  
However,	  I	  am	  not	  here	  to	  explore	  ultimate	  reality	  but	  to	  reveal	  forgotten	  blind	  spots	  in	  the	  
smothering	  materialistic	  vision	  of	  scientism,	  which	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  academic	  and	  
popular	  world,	  purports	  to	  be	  unassailable.	  If	  mind	  and	  matter	  are	  mysteriously	  and	  
inextricably	  intermingled,	  materialism	  cannot	  be	  the	  whole	  story,	  and	  you	  cannot	  be	  
merely	  a	  product	  of	  brain	  activity.	  Ultimately	  speaking,	  you	  are	  much	  more	  than	  your	  brain.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	  above	  indicates	  that	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  is	  at	  least	  unnecessary.	  A	  brain	  does	  
not	  learn	  on	  its	  own;	  we	  learn,	  and	  we	  are	  not	  our	  brains.	  The	  brain	  responds	  to	  our	  
learning	  and	  experiences	  our	  active	  embodiment	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  and	  in	  the	  mutually	  
creative	  process	  of	  culture.	  It	  is	  fascinating	  to	  study	  the	  brain	  and	  how	  it	  changes	  as	  the	  
person	  learns,	  but	  there	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  any	  benefit	  in	  terms	  of	  new	  learning	  techniques.	  If	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the	  brain	  is	  a	  pulsating	  grey	  machine,	  it	  is	  as	  determinative	  and	  functionally	  structured	  as	  a	  
machine;	  we	  can	  do	  little	  but	  attempt	  to	  improve	  its	  functioning	  via	  technological	  
adaptations	  or	  molecular	  bioengineering.	  If	  the	  brain	  is	  as	  plastic	  as	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  
prefers,	  it	  is	  also	  neither	  determining	  nor	  predictable.	  A	  thoroughly	  adaptable	  plastic	  brain	  
will	  continue	  to	  learn	  from	  and	  adapt	  to	  human	  interactive	  experience	  in	  the	  worlds	  of	  
culture	  and	  nature.	  
	  
But	  other	  voices	  see	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  as	  not	  just	  unnecessary.	  Insofar	  as	  brain-­‐
based	  learning	  represents	  the	  broader	  continuing	  paradigm	  shift	  into	  scientism	  –	  the	  
reductionist	  ontology	  of	  mechanistic-­‐objective-­‐materialism	  –	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  lived	  
reality	  process	  in	  which	  we	  are	  each	  creative	  participants	  is	  thrown	  into	  question,	  if	  not	  
disrepute.	  For	  those	  of	  us	  who	  see	  our	  ultimate	  truth	  in	  the	  human	  experience,	  brain-­‐based	  
learning	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  dehumanizing	  times.	  Wittgensteinian	  scholar	  Peter	  Hacker	  –	  
interviewed	  by	  Garvey	  (2010)	  –	  recently	  addressed	  the	  danger	  of	  scientism	  in	  no	  uncertain	  
terms:	  
The	  main	  barrier	  is	  the	  scientism	  that	  pervades	  our	  mentality	  and	  our	  culture.	  
We	  are	  prone	   to	   think	   that	   if	   there’s	  a	   serious	  problem,	   science	  will	   find	   the	  
answer.	  If	  science	  cannot	  find	  the	  answer,	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  a	  serious	  problem	  
at	   all.	   That	   seems	   to	   me	   altogether	   wrong.	   It	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	  
thought	   that	  philosophy	   is	   in	   the	  same	  business	  as	  science,	  as	  either	  a	  hand-­‐
maiden	  or	  as	  the	  vanguard	  of	  science.	  This	  prevailing	  scientism	  is	  manifest	  in	  
the	  infatuation	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  with	  cognitive	  neuroscience.	  The	  associated	  
misconceptions	   have	   started	   to	   filter	   down	   into	   the	   ordinary	   discourse	   of	  
educated	  people.	  You	  just	  have	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  BBC	  to	  hear	  people	  nattering	  on	  
about	   their	   brains	   and	   what	   their	   brains	   do	   or	   don’t	   do,	   what	   their	   brains	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Finally,	  neuroscientist	  and	  philosopher	  Raymond	  Tallis	  (2011)	  truculently	  observes:	  
The	  distinctive	  features	  of	  human	  beings	  –	  self-­‐hood,	   free	  will,	   that	  collective	  
space	   called	   the	   human	  world,	   the	   sense	   that	   we	   lead	   our	   lives	   rather	   than	  
simply	   live	   them	  as	  organisms	  do	  –	  are	  being	  discarded	  as	  illusions	  by	  many,	  
even	   by	   philosophers,	  who	   should	   think	   a	   little	   bit	   harder	   and	   question	   the	  
glamour	  of	  science	  rather	  than	  succumbing	  to	  it.	  …	  [B]iologism	  is	  not	  only	  bad	  
science	   and	   bad	   philosophy	   –	   bad	   enough	   –	   but	   also	   bad	   for	   humanity.	   And	  
even	  if	  we	  are	  not	  worried	  when	  various	  modes	  of	  biologistic	  pseudo-­‐science	  
are	  ubiquitous	  in	  our	  talk	  about	  ourselves,	  surely	  we	  should	  worry	  when	  they	  
are	  starting	  to	  be	  invoked	  by	  policy-­‐makers.	  (pp.	  8-­‐9)	  
	  
Brain-­‐based	  learning	  is	  a	  symptom	  of	  this	  scientism;	  it	  is	  neither	  good	  science	  nor	  good	  
philosophy.	  So,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  exegesis,	  I	  repeat:	  brain-­‐based	  learning	  is	  at	  the	  least	  
unnecessary,	  but	  the	  ontology	  it	  assumes	  might	  be	  philosophically	  dangerous.	  It	  supports	  a	  
narrow	  worldview	  peculiar	  to	  scientifically	  advanced	  societies,	  ignoring	  other	  expressions	  
of	  the	  human	  spirit.	  Of	  course,	  anything	  that	  encourages	  teachers	  and	  learners	  in	  their	  
learning	  is	  worth	  pursuing	  to	  some	  degree,	  but	  the	  hidden	  motivations	  of	  those	  who	  
advocate	  brain-­‐based	  learning,	  teaching	  to	  the	  brain,	  or	  other	  educational	  fads	  should	  
always	  be	  considered;	  and,	  more	  important,	  the	  larger	  worldview	  assumed	  by	  any	  
educational	  movement	  should	  be	  open	  to	  critical	  or	  philosophical	  inquiry	  lest	  it	  simply	  
becomes	  “self-­‐evident”	  due	  to	  passive	  compliance,	  assuming	  the	  mantle	  of	  the	  only	  
acceptable	  truth.	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NOTES: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i Aside from numerous websites, some oft-cited foundational names include Cercone (2006); Caine, 
Caine, & Crowell (1999); Jensen (2008); Sousa (2010); Sprenger (2010); Sylwester (1995, 2003); Tate 
(2006); Weiss (2000); Zull (2011). 
ii “Evolution works by selection, not by instruction” (Sylwester, 1995, p. 19). 
iii See, for example, Churchland (1986) and Dennett (1991). Churchland is so taken with the brain 
she called her book Neurophilosophy and sees herself as neurophilosopher. 
iv Gazzinga’s “moot” of self (psychological) guidance, however, is the neuroscientific view embraced 
by brain-based learning, which appears to believe that our knowledge of brain functioning will 
enable us to choose actions that will assist the brain in choosing actions to aid us in our learning. (I 
trust the circularity of this reasoning is obvious.) 
v These range from the older EEG and PET scans to fMRI imaging and to the most recent 3-D 
technique – “functional electrical impedance tomography by evoked response (fEITER)” 
(ScienceDaily, 2011). 
vi It might be noted that esoteric thinking as found in early Buddhism would say that I – my 
awareness or ego-consciousness – is but an aspect of a larger infinite Awareness limited by 
constraints of nature (e.g., brain and body) and culture. So, instead of referring to “my” awareness, 
it may be more accurate to say that “I” am but a local focus of Awareness itself. 
vii The actual form into which the wave collapses can be usually inferred by probability theory, but 
there is never a guarantee the merely probable will occur. 
viii There numerous attempts to explore quantum-mind interdependence from which I am 
generalizing, but I would recommend Stapp (2007) or Globus (2009) for attempts to explain this 
abstruse area. 
ix Basically ToM (theory of mind) theories suggest we come to believe others have minds like us 
since we observe them react in similar ways to the ways we would react – and we know firsthand that 
we have minds. If primary intersubjectivity is true, however, we identify with others’ minds before 
our own. 
x This does not deny the findings of neuroscience that show a readiness potential in the brain precedes 
all conscious choices by a notable time margin – as recently outlined by neuroscientist (and proud 
atheist), Sam Harris (2012) in his little volume against free will – but it also supports the earlier 
findings of neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet (1985) that showed free choice can veto the movement 
that the readiness potential was initiating. With so many complex influences on us every second, so 
many contrary impulses demanding action, such veto power may be the essential key to our ongoing 
sense of a freely choosing self. 
xi Psyche, from the Greek for soul or spirit, has a rich tradition in mythology, Platonism and 
hermeticism as the anima mundi or world soul. In C. G. Jung, it refers the universal awareness of the 
collective unconscious: “Sooner or later nuclear physics and the psychology of the unconscious will 
draw closer together as both of them, independently of one another and from opposite directions, 
push forward into transcendental territory, the one with the concept of the atom, the other with that 
of the archetype” (Jung, 1951, p. 412). 
xii Both dual-aspect monism and neutral monism may originate as interpretations of the metaphysics 
of Baruch Spinoza. 
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